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Abstract 
Nowadays, conflicts between the involved parties in projects are common. So a useful decision making method should be 
considered for a better decision. Game theory approach can be used as an efficient framework in decision making about some 
problems and conflicts in construction projects. The aim of this paper is to find the best outcome in conflicts for every player 
Chicken Game. Two types of probabilistic conflicts during the construction project have been discussed based on these two games 
and the results highlight the applicability of the game theory applica
ent 
problems. 
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1. Introduction 
    Managing construction projects usually involves some conflicts which may occur among the stakeholders, main 
contractors and/or among main contractors and sub-contractors. However, achieving a win-win situation is the most 
nditions for all 
involved parties in the construction projects. These conflicts can occur during the executing of the project because any 
parties involved in the project may act on behalf of themselves whereas in game theory approach benefits of whole 
parties are considered.  
   Game theory can recognize and clarify the behaviors of parties involved in the project to construction project 
problems and describe how interactions of different parties such as stakeholders (client), main contractors or 
subcontractors can lead to project evolving. The game theory and optimization methods results are often different 
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because in optimization methods all parties are willing to act in which can lead to the best results for the whole 
system, while in the game theory each party tend to act in which can lead to the most logical outcome for him that may 
not be the best result for the whole of the system. This study surveys suitability of game theory to construction project 
Structure management and conflicts solutions through a series of non-cooperative construction project contract games. 
The paper illustrates some contractual structure of construction project problems and consequences of considering the 
e usefulness of game theory approach in 
construction projects and conflicts resolutions related to them by discussing the basic concepts of game theory and 
demonstrating some simple construction project conflicts by using some kind of game theory approach such as 
 
 2. Literature review 
     The existed conflicts in construction issues not only limited to the sharing of expenses or profits between main 
contractors and sub contractors, but also, sometimes there are conflicts driven from clients and main contractors due to 
the non-cooperative behaviors between them. These conflicts may be driven from different issues such as project 
delays or suspension, differing site conditions, contract changes and etc. If these conflicts not peacefully be resolved, 
they can lead to non compensable consequences, such as project suspension that can cause considerable lost for both 
parties involved in the project. In this situation the best decision should be considered for resolving the conflicts. 
 
     Different quantitative and qualitative methods have been proposed for conflict resolution in water resource 
management, and some of them have been mentioned in Madani (2010):  
Interactive Computer-Assisted Negotiation Support system (ICANS) (Thiessen and Loucks, 1992; Thiessen et al., 
1998), Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) (Hipel et al., 1997), Shared Vision Modeling (Lund and Palmer, 
1997), Adjusted Winner (AW) mechanism (Massoud, 2000), Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) (Wolf, 2000), 
Multivariate Analysis Biplot (Losa et al., 2001), and Fuzzy Cognitive Maps (Giordano et al., 2005). Wolf (2002) 
presents some significant papers and case studies on the prevention and resolution of conflict (using descriptive 
methods) over water resources. 
 
     Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) introduced basic concepts of cooperative game theory and Shapley (1953) 
introduced the Shapley value as a cooperative game in order to used as a cost and benefits allocation in a coalition.  
Fuzzy coalition w -dimensional vector 
. 
 
     One of the most efficient tools to investigate these issues is game theory. In the construction management different 
decision-makers are involved at various stages such as design, construction, operation, utilization and maintenance, 
due to that the use of game theory is required in the definition and interpretation of the behavior of different parties 
involved the system. The most common issue in every project is that all involved parties prefer their own profits to 
overall system profits. Due to that the results obtained from game theory approach are different from results of 
traditional optimization method. Game theory provides a framework for evaluating the effects of individual decision 
has not been used well in construction projects yet. Thus it is still unclear for all parties involved in the construction 
projects owing to lack of knowledge and understanding its basic concept. Game theory will become so interesting in 
construction industry to realize and resolve some construction projects conflicts which might not logically be solved 
since this method can better reflect behaviors of the parties involved in the project. 
 
     This paper illustrates the usefulness of game theory approach in construction projects and conflicts resolutions 
related to them by discussing the basic concepts of game theory and demonstrating some simple construction project 
games. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
     This paper has studied the application and the applicability of the Game theory approach in solving construction 
management problems.  Two game theory structures have been discussed here, first of all, pr The 
police. The police suspect that they are in charge of a crime, but do not have adequate evidence to prove it in court. 
For shriving from criminals, police put them in separate cells without any communication to each other.  And, so 
imagine two young drivers are driving two fast cars toward 
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each other in a narrow road. The probability of death for both young drivers is high, if none of them turn his direction. 
The priorities of these two drivers in this game are that they will not play the timid role. So the best payoff is to have 
your opponent be the chicken.  Two problems have been discussed based on this two games and the results emphasis 
the applicability of the game theory application in construction management field. 
 
4. What is game theory? 
 
     Game Theory was firstly explored by a French mathematician named Borel in 1921. Emile Borel published several 
papers on the theory of games. He used poker as an example and addressed the problem of second-guessing the 
opponent in a game. He imagined using game theory in economic and military applications and his goal was to 
determine, whether a best strategy for a given game exists and find that strategy. However, he did not develop his idea 
very far. Due to that, most historians give the credit for improving game theory to John Von Neuman(1903), who 
published his first paper on game theory in 1928, seven years after Borel. 
 
     Game theory is a method originated from the mathematical sciences in which is used in competitive or cooperative 
position to find optimal choices that will lead to desired outcome. In every game at least two players will be involved 
interesting in some fields such as economics, sociology, political and management sciences. In the mentioned fields 
game theory can be used to anticipate the best result. 
 
     
ding to that belief. In a game, players 
them. Game theory says that whenever people are playing with each other in the strategic environment, how they 
behave rationally. Thus this approach can cause the rational and best results for the player. 
 
     Game theory has different extension and it is categorized into different classification such as dynamic and static 
game, zero-sum and non-zero-sum game and etc. In dynamic games players make decision in response to other 
 
 
     A zero-sum game is one in which no wealth is created or destroyed. So, in a two-player zero-sum game, whatever 
one player wins, the other loses. The theory of zero-sum games is immensely different from that of non-zero-sum 
games, because an optimal solution can always be found. Most of the games in the real life are non-zero-sum games. 
All players may lose or win in this kind of games and cooperation of players in this type of games can lead to win-win 
situation for all players. Most of the construction management issues are also the non-zero-sum games in which the 
collaboration of involved parties (players) can achieve the better result for the system. The typical non-zero-sum 
investigate and model some construction issues and conflicts in these kinds of non-sum-zero games between client and 
main-contractor and between main-contractors and sub-contractor to specify and clarify the best solution for them 
(players) and whole system. 
 
 
     Dilemma game was first proposed by Merill Flood (1951). In this game two suspects are captured 
by the police. The police suspect that they are in charge of a crime, but do not have adequate evidence to prove it in 
court. For shriving from criminals, police put them in separate cells without any communication to each other. If 
neither prisoner confesses, both will be convicted of about one year. If both confess to their crime then both will be 
sentenced to 5 years. If however, one prisoner confesses to his crime, while the other does not, then the prisoner who 
confessed will be forgiven while the prisoner who did not confess will be convicted to 10 years. In this stage the 
 each of them against the 
solution. For implementing this game in the framework of game theory, firstly, the game should be written in matrix 
form. The value in each cell shows the time spent in prison. 
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Table 1.  
Player 2 (Criminal 2)Strategies which can be used for  
DenyConfess
,5, 5)ConfessPlayer 1 (Criminal 1)
( 1, 1 )( 10, 0)Deny
 
     With regard to the above matrix, each prisoner is looking to minimize his prison time. Since the criminal 1 and/or 
player 1 does not know whether his partner in crime has confessed or not, first he assumes that he has not. If prisoner 
1 does not confess either then both will go to the prison for 1 year. this is good for them. But, if prisoner 1 confesses, 
he will go free, while his partner goes to prison. Now consider the other possibility that Prisoner 2 confesses. In this 
situation if prisoner 1 does not confess, he will go to prison for 10 years. But if he does confess, he will be in prison 
for 5 years. In this case it is obviously better to confess. According to the matrix, it is obvious that the best payoff for 
the both prisoners is when neither confesses. But game theory says that it is better for both to confess, since this 
situation is a non-cooperative form, so the player cannot rely on the other player. 
 
As is understood from the results of the game, players in the game should choose a decision to find the best outcome 
must be said that the Nash equilibrium point is not necessarily coincide with the Pareto optimal point.  
 
Table 2. S  
Player 2
and the Nash equilibrium point ,and choosing the confessing 
strategy by both players DenyConfess
,5, 5)Confess
Player 1
( 1, 1 )( 10, 0)Deny
 
      
(Confess, Deny) - 2. (Deny, confess)- 3. (Deny, Deny). But the choice of the players is the point except for the Pareto 
-cooperative game will choose the Nash equilibrium that is 
(Confess, confess). (Confess, confess) strategy is the one that will minimize the win chance of opponent. 
 
 
 
Practical example: 
 
      Imagine a big project has been divided into two phases, faze1&faze2. The main contractor handed over these 
phases to sub-contractor1 and sub-contractor2. During the executing of these two phases by these sub-contractors, 
some infrastructure works such as drainage, sewerage and slope protection must be executed for these phases. Due to 
lack of space and time and much more additional cost, it is more beneficial for the main-contractor to contract with 
these sub-contractors instead of contracting with the third (new) sub-contractor. So with regard to this situation, main-
contractor bids a price to sub-contractor 1&2 for implementation of these infrastructure works. Here a question for 
each of the sub-contractors that will happen is that what each of them should decide to make the best decision against 
the other sub-contractor. Th
solution. For implementing this game in the framework of game theory, first it should be written in the matrix form. 
 
Table3: mma game for sub-contractor 1&2 
 
Player 2 (and/or Sub-contractor 2)
sub-contractor 1&2 Denying doing the 
infrastructure works
Accepting doing the 
infrastructure works
P3,0P1,P2)Accepting doing the infrastructure works
Player 1 (and/or Sub-
contractor1)
( P4,P4) (0,P3) Denying doing the infrastructure works
 
P1= P2,   P3= P1+P2   , P4 > P1& P2, P3> P4 
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      Assuming there is not any communication between the both of sub-contractors. In fact, it is a non-cooperative 
game which both sub-
situation for both sub-contractors. 
Situation 1: [sub-con1 (accepting), sub-con2 (accepting)]: The achieved benefits by this situation are (P1, P2) for sub-
contractor1&2 that P1= P2. In this strategy, benefits are divided between both sub-contractors and each of them makes 
profit from that. 
Situation 2: [sub-con1 (accepting), sub-con2 (denying)]: The benefit achieved in this situation is (P3, 0). In this 
strategy all of the benefit is achieved by sub-contractor1. 
Situation 3: [sub-con1 (denying), sub-con2 (accepting)]: The benefit achieved in this situation is (P3, 0). In this 
strategy all of the benefit is achieved by sub-contractor2. 
Situation 4: [sub-con1 (denying), sub-con2 (denying)]: In this situation both of the sub-contractors think that if they do 
not accept the main- -contractor has to increase the bid price. Then both sub-contractors 
can make more profit. In fact this strategy can be used when both sub-
Then the benefit achieved by subcontractors is P4 that P4>P1&P2 and P3>P4. But in this situation, there would be no 
guarantee that any of the ones will not infract the agreement. 
 
      l points in this game 
which are (accepting, denying), (denying, accepting) and (denying, denying). But the Nash equilibrium point is 
(accepting, accepting) that is the best strategy which can be achieved the most profit for each of sub-contractors with 
con  
 
4.2. Chicken game 
     The other interesting game which can be used in construction management is chicken game. In this game, imagine 
two young drivers are driving by two fast cars toward each other in a narrow road. The probability of death for both 
young drivers is high, if none of them turn his direction. The priorities of these two drivers in this game are that they 
will not play the timid role. So the best payoff is to have your opponent be the chicken. The worst possible payoff is to 
crash to each other. So in the matrix for this game, this situation has the least value. We assign it 1. As mentioned 
before, the best payoff for each driver is to have his opponent be the chicken, so we assign it a value 4. The next worst 
possibility is to be the chicken, so we assign this a value 2. The last possibility is that both drivers swerve at the same 
time. We assign this a value 3. In this strategy they can maintain their pride and life, so this is preferable to being the 
chicken. But in these circumstances none of the players neither will be a loser nor will be a winner. 
 
Table 4: Strategies which can be used for chicken game 
Player 2 (Driver2) Strategies which can be used for  
chicken gameDo not swerve Swerve
2, 4 3, 3) Swerve
Player 1 (Driver1)
( 1, 1 ) ( 4, 2) Do not swerve
 
     According to the matrix above, the game has two Nash equilibrium points that are (swerve, do not swerve) and (do 
not swerve, swerve). In addition being the Nash equilibrium, these two options can be also Pareto optimal points. 
There is also another optimal Pareto point that is (swerve, swerve). At this point, both players reach to equality state 
and the play will have no loser or winner. 
 
4.2.1. Application of chicken game in resolving the probabilistic conflicts during the construction 
     Many factors can affect the finishing of the project on time. One of them is delaying on delivery of material on site 
which will cause a delay the project. Assuming in a project, 70 percent of work has been implemented. At this time, 
unavailability of some materials in the market causes an interruption in the project. On the other hand, this activity is 
in critical path according to the work schedule which every interruption on that can directly affect the project 
completion date and will lead to the delay. In this situation, the dispute arises between client and contractor, since on 
the one hand, the client discerns this delay as a non-
other hand the contractor tries to justify this situation to change the delay to excusable delay for getting the additional 
time from the client. In this situation, the contractor has two ways or strategies: 
 1. Taking the short-term corrective action such as work over time  
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 2. Does not take any short-term corrective action and continue the project implementation with the previous speed. 
 
     Chicken game is one kind of game theory for modelling the situation of this conflict between contractor and client. 
For modelling this game in the framework of game theory, first it must be written in the matrix form. 
 
Table 5. Strategies which can be used by client & contractor in chicken game theory 
Player 2 (contractor) Strategies which can be used by client & contractor in 
chicken game theoryNon over time work 
(fixed speed)
Over time work 
(increase mobility)
2, 4 3, 3) Gives extension time
Player 1 (client)
( 1, 1 ) ( 4, 2) Gives no extension time
 
     The numbers shown in the matrix above are qualitative and they determine just the desirability of the outcome than 
the others. The situation [Client (gives no extension time), contractor (non over time work)] can lead to the worse 
status that may cause the project suspension. This game has two Nash equilibrium points, (no extension time, overtime 
work) and (extension time, non overtime work). This means that eventually, one of the players (client or contractor) 
should compromise to help in continuing of the project. 
 
5. Conclusion 
     Facing conflicts in construction managing problems due to the different involved decision makers are unavoidable.  
And so, analyzing this kind of problems is so different compare to the single decision maker ones.  In single decision 
maker problems most of the analysis is taking a place using the traditional optimization and/or simulation methods.  
However, using these mentioned traditional optimization simulation methods are still effective for multi-decision 
maker problems but, they are not enough for a proper analysis.  Therefore, using other methods such as game theory 
approach would be so helpful for multi-decision maker problem analysis.  In this study, we tried to analyze and model 
two problems in constructing management using game theory approach.  Firstly, we define a problem in which two 
different decision makers as two sub-contractors of a big project should are involved in.  In this problem, each of these 
two sub-contractor should analyze and predic
denying an offer from the upper contractor.  This game is analyzed using prison dilemma structure.  The result 
emphasizes the applicability of the prisons dilemma game structure in analyzing such a problem.  The other interesting 
game which has been used here is chicken game.  We analyzed the other constructing management problem, using 
chicken game which is a conflict between two decision makers.  One of these two decision makers is a client and the 
other is a contractor.  The application of the chicken game is so helpful for analyzing this game.  Therefore, it can be 
said that using game theory approach is so helpful for analyzing construction management problems.  And for more 
research we can focus on the dynamic game in constructing management cost problems.  
 
References 
[1] -San Joaquin Delta Conflict: Chicken or Prisoner's 
s Congress 2010: Challenges of 
Change Proceedings of the World Environmental and Water Resources Congress 2010.  
[2] Madani, K. Journal of Hydrology, Vol. 381 No.3-4, pp. 225-238. 
[3] Fang, L., Hipel, K.W., Kilgour, D.M., 1993. Interactive Decision Making: The Graph Model for Conflict 
Resolution. Wiley, New York, USA. 
[4] 
Update 3 (108), 70 82. 
[5] Massoud, T.G., (2  Palestinian 
358. 
[6] 62. 
1592   Azin Shakiba Barough et al. /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  58 ( 2012 )  1586 – 1593 
[7] e theoretic approach for inter-basin water resources 
-009-1070-y 
[8] ater 
Resour Res 18:463 475. 
[9] - A Case 
 
[10] lication to Natural, Environmental, and Water 
WPS4072. (http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2006/11/21/00001640 
6_20061121155643/Rendered/PDF/wps4074.pdf). 
[11] -assisted negotiation of multi-objective water 
177. 
[12] Thiessen, E.M., Loucks, D.P., Stedinger, J.R., 1998. Computer-assisted negotiations of water 
resources conflicts. Group Decision and Negotiation (7), 109 129. 
[13] Fang, 
 
[14] 
roceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, 
vol. 1, Le Touquet, France, October 17 20, pp. 17 20. 
[15] Lund, J.R., Palmer, R.N (1997). "Water Resource System Modeling for Conflict Resolution". Water 
Resources Update, Vol.3, No.108, pp.70-82. Update 3 (108), 70 82. 
[16] Massoud, T.G., 2000. Fair division, adjusted winner procedure (AW), and the Israeli  Palestinian 
Conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, 333 358. 
[17] gotiations and implications for 
373. 
[18] 
-Criteria Decision Analysis (10), 273 284. 
[19] Giordano, R., Passarella, G., Uricchio, V.F., Vurro, M., 2005. Fuzzy cognitive maps for issue 
identification in a water resources conflict resolution system. Physics and Chemistry of the Earth, Parts 
A/B/C 30 (6 7), 463 469. 
[20] 
373. 
[21] Von Neumann, J., Morgenstern, O., (1944).  Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, USA. 
[22] 
279-A:891 894. 
[23] -
Contributions to the Theory of Games, vol. II, in Annals of Mathematical Studies 28, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, pp. 307 317. 
[24] 
279-A:891 894. 
[25] Sadegh, M., Mahjouri, N., Kerachian, R. -Basin Water Allocation Using Crisp 
Water Resources Management , pp. 1-20, Art. 
1593 Azin Shakiba Barough et al. /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  58 ( 2012 )  1586 – 1593 
[26] Mahjou -basin water resources 
-18. 
[27] ng approaches for modeling 
59. 
[28] Wang, L., Fang, L., Hipel, K.W
Group Decision and Negotiation , Article in Press, pp. 1-16. 
[29] -
Contributions to the Theory of Games, vol. II, in Annals of Mathematical Studies 28, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, pp. 307 317. 
[30] 
International Journal of Game Theory, 10 (1): 35-43. 
[31] 
Publishers, pp. 1-12; pp. 91-110. 
[32] 
-208. 
 
 
